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CURRENT DECISIONS
same rights to "seamen" heretofore bereft of an unseaworthiness claim
within state waters.30 The Court advocates, without explicitly holding,
exclusive use of maritime remedies and duties of care, thereby preclud-
ing the necessity of accommodating maritime law with state remedial
statutes. 1
In spite of the sweeping authority of Moragne, maritime law must still
live with the effects of piecemeal legislation. While all voids are filled,
litigation remains unduly complicated by the need to search various au-
thorities to determine the most beneficial award.32 Congress should re-
spond by extending the coverage of the Death on the High Seas Act-
applicable to "any person"-from beyond the three-mile limit up to the
shoreline. 33
LAWRENCE J. LIPKA
Armed Services-CoNsCIENTIOUS OBjEcToRs-A TEST OF SINCERITY.
Welsh v. United States, 90 S. Ct. 1792 (1970).
In 1966, Elliot A. Welsh, II, claimed exemption from military serv-
ice as a conscientious objector.- His claim was denied. Upon refusal to
submit to induction into the armed forces, he was convicted of violating
the Universal Military Training and Service Act.2 The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed his conviction.3 In Welsb v. United States,4
the Supreme Court reviewed its previous decision in United States v.
30. See note 28 supra.
31. 90 S. Ct. 1791-92 (1970).
32. The Moragne Court refrained from spelling out the elements of the new cause
of action under general maritime law. Certain technical aspects such as the statute of
limitation and the list of beneficiaries who can assert the claim can be determined
by analogy to existing federal maritime statutes.
Moragne should have expressly overruled Tungus by declaring that state statutes,
if used, should only provide a remedy and not state substantive duties. But this was
not done. Conceivably, therefore, one beneficiary claiming for wrongful death under
general maritime law, might assert his right by analogy to existing federal maritime
statutes, while another might assert his claim by analogy to state statutes using the
state statutory list of survivors and standards of care.
33. A bill has been introduced in the United States Senate which would, among
other things, extend the Death on the High Seas Act to include deaths in state territorial
waters. To date no hearings have been scheduled or other action taken on the bill.
S. 3143, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2, 9 (1969), reprinted in 115 CONG. REc. S 14,355
(daily ed. Nov. 14, 1969).
1. Universal Military Training and Service Act, 50 U.S.C. APP. § 456(j) (1964).
2. 50 U.S.C. APP. § 462 (1964).
3. Welsh v. United States, 404 F.2d 1078 (9th Cir. 1968).
4. 90 S. Ct. 1792 (1970). 1
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Seeger5 Reversing Welsh's conviction, the Court held that " [i] f an in-
dividual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs which are purely ethical or
moral in source and content but which nevertheless impose upon him
duty of conscience to refrain from participating in any war at any
time.. ." he is entitled under the Military Selective Service Act of 1967'
to a conscientious objector exemption.7
Religious objectors have been provided with some form of conscrip-
tion exemption since 1775 when the First Continental Congress unani-
mously passed a resolution exempting those who, because of "religious"
principles, could not lend themselves to the war effort." The Draft Act
of 19179 expressly exempted those of "any well recognized sect ... whose
existing creed or principles [forbade] .. .its members to participate in
war in any form." 10 In 1940, Congress included in the exemption not
only members of the accepted peace churches, but also individuals "who,
by reason of religious training and belief," are opposed to war in any
form.1'
After the passage of this legislation, the Second Circuit granted con-
scientious objector exemptions to those who were opposed to war not
on any basis of a religious obligation to a deity but solely on humani-
tarian grounds.12 But the Ninth Circuit applied a more stringent defi-
nition to the word "religion," and refused exemption in the absence of
an express "belief in God, involving duties superior to those arising from
a human relation." '" The resultant dichotomy of the circuits prompted
Congress to attempt a resolution of the problem. 4 Thus in 1948, the
5. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
6. Military Selective Service Act of 1967, § 7, 81 Stat. 100, 104, 50 U.S.C. App.
§ 456(j) (Supp. 1968).
7. 90 S. Ct. at 1796.
8. 2 JoUmRALs oF THM CONI-NENTAL CONGRESS 189 (1905). Although the Federal
Conscription Law of 1863, 12 Star. 731, contained no such exemption, it reappeared
in the Conscription Law of 1864, ch. 13, § 17, 13 Star. 6, 9.
9. Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, § 4, 40 Stat. 76.
10. 40 Stat. 78.
11. Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, § 5(g), 54 Star. 889. Until
this time, the exemption was limited to members of religious denominations specifically
prohibited by their respective articles of faith from bearing arms.
12. United States ex reL Reel v. Badt, 141 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1944); United States
ex rel Phillips v. Downer, 135 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1943).
13. Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377, 380 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S.
795 (1946).
14. The Second Circuit was holding that a conscientious belief against war, not
necessarily based on any obligation to a deity, qualified as a religion, while the Ninth
Circuit had concluded that the petitioner's philosophy, morals, and social policy
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Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 was amended to provide that
conscientious objector exemptions were to be granted only when the
petitioner's religious convictions were based on belief in a Supreme Be-
ing.Lz
In 1963, the Second Circuit avoided determining the constitutional
validity of this amendment by reverting to its pre-1948 definition of "re-
ligion" in granting exemption to an agnostic.16 The Supreme Court,
in a similar interpretation of the "religion" test in United States v.
Seeger,17 held that as long as the objector's belief was neither insincere
nor accompanied by a disavowal of all conventional beliefs he was en-
titled to an exemption. The test was apparently one of sincerity and
nothing more; belief in a Supreme Being was not required. 8
While Seeger took the monumental step of declaring that a conven-
tional "religious" belief was no longer required,19 Welsh went one step
further in allowing exemption to a party who expressly denied that his
beliefs were religious. While logically this is but a natural extension of
the Seeger doctrine, it does make it clear that courts are not conforming
to the legislative intent, and that standards for determining conscientious
objector status have become ultimately subjective.20 While the Court has
not expressly discarded the "religion" test, by holding that sincere and
without the concept of a deity did not qualify as "religion" under section 5(g). See
cases cited in notes 12 and 13 supra.
15. Selective Service Act of 1948, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 604, 612, 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j)
(1964).
16. United States v. Jakobson, 325 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1963). Had the court chosen
to hear the constitutional issue, it would have had to determine if the statutory
requirement of a belief in a Supreme Being is consistent with the First Amendments
free exercise clause in exempting members of certain religions advocating belief in a
God while members of non-theistic religions (Buddhism, Taoism) would be refused
consideration as conscientious objectors.
17. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
18. See generally United States v. Stolberg, 346 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1965) where
petitioner was granted conscientious objector status despite his non-belief in a Supreme
Being, not believing in any after-life, and nonaffiliation with any established, or even
known, religious sect. See also United States v. Owen, 415 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1969);
Bishop v. United States, 412 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1969); United States v. Persall,
302 F. Supp. 217 (N.D. Ala. 1969); United States v. Naves, 304 F. Supp. 230 (D. Colo.
1969).
19. For a sound treatment of the events and history leading to the landmark Seeger
decision, see Rabin, When is a Religious Belief Religious: United States v. Seeger and
the Scope of Free Exercise, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 231 (1966); Comment, Conscientious
Objectors-Tbe New "Parallel Belief" Test-United States v. Seeger, 14 CATHOLIC U.
OF AM. L. REv. 238 (1965).
20. See The Supreme Court, 1952 Term, 79 HAIv. L. REv. 113, 116 (1965) for an
excellent discussion of the unworkability of the Seeger standards.
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meaningful beliefs which prompt the registrant's objection to all wars
need not be confined in either source or content to traditional or paro-
chial concepts of religion, the test has become unworkable.21 The pres-
ent effect is clearly not what the framers of the Universal Military Train-
ing and Service Act envisioned.
PETER M. DESLER
Evidence-DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE-THE RIGHT OF CONFRONTA-
TION. Robertson v. Commonwealtb, 211 Va. 62, 175 S.E.2d 260 (1970).
The defendant was found guilty of the rape of two girls, ages nine
and eleven. His conviction was based on the testimony of the girls and
the results of laboratory tests performed on vaginal specimens taken
from the victims. A copy of the laboratory report was admitted into
evidence under the authority of section 19.1-45 of the Virginia Code.'
The defendant on appeal contended that the admission of the lab-
oratory report into evidence violated his constitutional right to cross-
examination of witnesses,2 but the Supreme Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia affirmed the conviction.3 The court construed the Code section
as permitting investigation reports by the Chief Medical Examiner,
which were not related to post-mortem examinations, to be prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein, and held that the Chief Medical
21. So unmanageable has this determination become that the Welsh court stated
that if petitioner classifies his beliefs as "religious" this is to be given "great weight,"
while if he characterizes his views as not religious "this is a highly unreliable guide
for those charged with administering the exemption." 90 S. Ct. at 1797.
1. VA. CoDE ANN. § 19.1-45 (Repl. Vol. 1960):
Reports and Records Received As Evidence.-Reports of investigations
made by the Chief Medical Examiner or his assistants or by medical
examiners, and the records and reports of autopsies made under the
authority of this chapter, shall be received as evidence in any court or
other proceeding, and copies of records, photographs, laboratory findings,
and records in the office of the Chief Medical Examiner or any medical
examiner . . . shall be received as evidence in any court or other pro-
ceeding for any purpose for which the original could be received without
any proof of the official character or the person whose name is signed
thereto.
2. U.S. CONsr. amend VI; VA. CONST. art. I, § 8. The Sixth Amendment right of
confrontation derives from the English common-law right which developed as a
reaction against the use of affidavits in the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh. Note,
Confrontation, Cross-Examination, and the Right To Prepare A Defense, 56 GEO. LJ.
Rv. 939, 957 n.136 (1968).
3. Robertson v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 62, 175 S.E.2d 260 (1970).
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